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Crisis is a productive state provided
you do not associate it with catastrophe.
(Max Frisch)
The sceptics said it would never happen. But in May 1998 Europe's heads of government
selected 11 countries to adopt the euro, which became an official currency in 1999 and
be phased in over three years. Astonishingly, many banks remain ill prepared. Although
most of them have tackled the IT and operational challenges raised by a single European
currency, especially local and regional banks in Germany have failed to address the more
difficult strategic issues. Put bluntly, they have not considered how they will prosper
once a single currency and the evolved structural changes in competition wipe out great
chunks of profit in their traditional businesses. These businesses accounted for between
40 and 80 percent of a local and regional bank's revenue.
To European banks as a whole, that revenue is worth approximately $ 100 billion; in less
than a decade, it could be slashed to $ 77 billion. Unless the banks can merge with their
neighbours in space and restructure their cost base, the overall decline in profits could be
even steeper.
EMU will, of course, also create growth opportunities. If the political, economic and
monetary objectives of monetary union are met, the euro could come to challenge the US
Dollar as the world's primary reserve currency, while the pooling of Europe's national
securities could create a capital market to rival north America's (exhibit 1).
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But the best opportunities in this new, vibrant market will probably fall to no more than a
handful of banks. Revenue growth in wholesale banking will be concentrated in the© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 3
investment banking businesses of equities, bonds, and mergers and acquisitions – areas in
which most banks will be hard pressed to match the skills and global reach of the US
investment banks already operating in Europe. In 1997 business in these areas is worth
approximately $ 14 billion. In less than a decade it could be worth $ 29 billion (exh. 2).



























Overall, EMU is likely to create more losers than winners in wholesale banking. Banks
that wish to survive in this harsh new environment should wake up to this dark reality, an
rethink their strategies.
A. Threats in wholesale banking
Certain competitive gaps could open between those European banks whose national
governments participate in EMU, and remaining European banks. But even more
worrying is the impact EMU will have on the industry as a whole. The three traditional
areas of wholesale business are under threat:
A1. Foreign exchange
The European foreign exchange market currently sees daily turnover of $ 798 billion
(including noneuropean currencies), from which European banks earn $ 6 to $ 8 billion a
year in total net revenues. The lion's share of this business is taken by the largest
commercial banks, which dominate foreign exchange trade in their domestic currencies.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 4
Huge trading flows help keep the cost of serving clients relatively low and give the banks
the market information and clout to help them profit from their own position-taking.
Following EMU, however, most European banks can expect a massive decline in foreign
exchange revenues and profits (exhibit 3).
Exhibit 3 - Impact on foreign exchange revenues
Example: Average European bank
Index: 1997 = 100
Status quo
Loss of intra-EMU customer turnover
Loss of business with large companies
Loss of revenue from market
share and information advantage
(one-third of total revenues)







Intra-European currency trading, worth about $ 3 billion in revenues a year, will simply
disappear. At the moment, this trade accounts for 35 to 40 percent of an average
European banks foreign exchange revenue, although for some banks that mainly trade
their domestic currencies against other European currencies - particularly those in
southern Europe - it represents a good deal more. The average bank will also see a
further fall in revenues of 30 to 37 percent, because even if it currently enjoys significant
market share in trading domestic currency, it may turn out to be a relatively small player
in the European market. It will therefore lose the scale advantages that helped it win the
business of large corporate and institutional customers and profit from position-taking.
All in all, the typical European bank in terms of asset size looks set to lose about 70
percent of foreign exchange trading revenues when national currencies are abolished,
leading inevitably to a rapid shakeout in the industry. Banks that succeed in becoming
large-volume Euro dealers will then be able to prize more and more business away from
smaller institutions, leading a market in which business is eventually consolidated among
a few key competitors whose scale advantages offset the downward pressure on margins.
In effect, it will resemble the US market, in which only 6 banks have foreign exchange© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 5
revenues exceeding $ 100 million. In Europe, more than 13 banks currently occupy this
bracket.
A2. Corporate banking
Corporate banking - which includes the lending, deposits, and clearing business - was
worth about $ 90 billion in Europe in 1996. Some $ 76 billion of this was accounted for
by lending and deposits alone. Without EMU, these two businesses could grow by
another 20 percent over the next 10 years. With EMU; revenues will shrink to as little as
$ 50 billion (exhibit 4).
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                 Lending                     Deposits
Corporate lending overcapacity and intense competition have prompted European banks
to offer corporations extremely cheap loans. Bank loans are consequently a leading
source of finance for European corporations. (In the United States, 7 percent of non-
financial companies' liabilities are in the form of bank loans; in Europe, the figure is 11
percent.)
These changes arise not just because of EMU. Banks are focussing more on
shareholders, and beginning to use access capital to buy backshares rather than lend at
barely profitable rates. Governments are keen to improve competitiveness by eliminating
state subsidies to banks (common in such countries as Austria) and preventing them from
offering preferential rates to companies in which they hold stakes.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 6
As for the pressures exerted by monetary union, the new European Central Bank (ECB)
looks set to impose reserve requirements on commercial banks within EMU, the cost of
which will probably be passed on to customers in form of higher lending rates. Add to
this decreation of a single, more liquid European corporate bond market, and it seems
likely that most large corporations will find it cheaper to raise debt through bond issues.
The disintermediation of this corporate business could reduce potential lending revenues
from $ 67 billion to about $ 43 billion.
Competition for the new structure in corporate lending business will be fierce. The
largest, best-capitalized commercial banks that can themselves raise money at low costs
will be the most favourably placed to offer competitive rates to the small and medium-
sized businesses that still need bank loans. The reduction of lending margins because of
competition could have a further $ 2 to $ 3 billion from corporate lending revenues,
bringing the final figure down to about $ 41 billion.
The deposit and money market business in 1997 is worth about $ 21 billion, and without
EMU might have grown to $ 26 billion over the next 10 years. With EMU, volumes fall
because corporate customers will no longer need to hold deposit accounts for each
European currency in which they trade, and traders will no longer use the money market
to take advantage of interest rate differentials between the currencies of EMU member
countries. As a result, deposit revenues will fall by about $ 8 billion.
Margins will also shrink because of stiff competition for the remaining business. As in the
foreign exchange markets, the advantage held (and the profits enjoyed) by the typical
European commercial bank in its domestic money market will disappear. Such banks will
then have to vie with many other players in a huge Euro money market. The winners will
be large banks with cost-efficient centralized trading, economies of scale, and superior
market information. Margin compression and loss of revenues from position-taking will
probably reduce revenue earned in the money market by a further $ 8 billion. Business
will be consolidated among a few large institutions.
The European payments business in 1997 is worth $ 14 billion. Much of this comes from
correspondent banking business, whereby banks hold accounts with other banks in order
to make and receive payments in foreign currencies. EMU will eliminate intra-european© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 7
currency payments, while the introduction of TARGET, a clearing system that enables
EMU member banks to make payments directly to one another in real time, will further
reduce the need for traditional correspondent banking services. Nonetheless, overall
cross-border payments will rise as cross-border trade continues to grow, so that revenues
could reach $ 18.5 billion by 2006.
In these markets too, larger institutions with economies of scale will win shares from
smaller, less efficient banks. Again, there will be a few big winners and many losers.
A3. Government bond trading
Banks operating in Europe currently generate revenues of $ 2 to $ 3 billion a year by
trading government bonds on customers' behalf. But the bank's own investments in its
government bonds have also been an important source of revenue and profits,
particularly in the run-up to EMU. 1998, one leading Portuguese commercial bank holds
a quarter of its assets in government bonds that yield an estimated 12 percent. Over the
past 3 years, the cost of funding this portfolio has fallen by about 6 percentage points as
interest rates have converged in the countdown to EMU. The result has been a sharp
increase in net revenues from the portfolio. Indeed, it has probably been the main driver
of the banks' recent profit growth.
Take away these one-off games, however, and the post-EMU outlook is bleak for many
banks in the government bond market. EU government debts stood at $ 6.3 trillion at the
end of 1997. Reducing each participating government's debt to 60 percent of GDP (as
stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty) implies a reduction in outstanding debt of $ 1.1
trillion, or 18 percent (assuming no further debt issuance). This will not happen by
January 1999 but the figures indicate the trend toward fewer debt issues, more
competition for selling and trading that debt, and slimmer margins. Approximately $ 2 to
$ 3 billion of revenue will have to be shared between only a handful of large-volume
institutions.
In addition, domestic banks will no longer win business on the basis of specialist
knowledge of their national currencies and interest rates. Historically, most investors
have traded European government bonds according to currency movements. But once
the foreign exchange risk is removed, the focus will be entirely on credits (i.e., one© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 8
country's credit risk versus another's). The winning banks will thus be those that can
effectively sell "credit stories" rather than "foreign exchange stories". Europe's market
will in a sense resemble the US market. It will be dominated by investment banks whose
size enables them to profit on slim margins, and which have a reputation for credit
analysis, partner-networks and sales capabilities born of experience in the huge US
corporate bond market.
B. Opportunities
Although there are threats a plenty, EMU will also create growth opportunities in
European wholesale banking. A single currency will produce a European capital market
far more liquid than any existing national European market, stimulating the municipal and
corporate bond markets as well as the equity market. It will also prompt the cross-border
consolidation of many industries, generating mergers and acquisitions and consulting
business. Investment and consulting banking and securities products and services will
therefore be in great demand.
B1. Municipal and corporate bonds
Although the Maastricht Treaty will constrain the issuance of government bonds, EMU
should promote a European corporate and municipal bond market. The former is almost
non-existent, but the latter is already beginning to show signs of growth. In Italy, for
example, several cities and regions have issued bonds to fund local infrastructure
projects.
In an aera of monetary restraint, the funding of large public infrastructure projects such
as hospitals and roads will increasingly be transferred to the private sector. Some of this
funding will be raised by privatizing assets currently owned by governments (i.e., by
equity financing), but a substantial proportion is likely to originate in the bond market,
because the stable revenues and capital value of many infrastructure projects make them
low credit risks that can be sold to investors without recourse to government backing.
The debt issuer might be a privatized company or a single-purpose funding vehicle.
Either way, these debt issues represent a massive opportunity for investment banks' bond
businesses.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 9
Another possibility is the development of a US-style municipal bond market to replace
government borrowing. Municipal bonds enable local authorities to issue debt without
central government garanties; to stimulate demand, the authorities offer investors tax
incentives. The market currently accounts for 40 percent to total new debt issues in the
United States each year, which suggests what the potential of this form of government
debt "privatization" might be. If the European market were to reach a similar level of
maturity, it could generate approximately $ 3.3 billion in revenues for banks in the form
of origination fees and trading income. Judging by US experience, municipal bonds could
also be one of the few areas in which European banks - even small ones - succeed in
competing with leading investment banks. Although large banks operate in the US
municipal bond market, many smaller regional banks are also leading participants, having
capitalized on their local presence to forge links with local government authorities. In
EMU, European banks have a similar advantage in a continental municipal bond market.
To date, corporate bonds have been a significant source of capital for companies in most
European countries. But a single more liquid European corporate bond market with a
bigger pool of potential investors will reduce the cost of entering the market - and
possibly the cost of borrowing - and thereby encourage a move away from bank loans as
a mean of financing. If European corporations were to use bonds to finance their debt to
the same extent as US corporations (where bonds account for 19 percent of total
liabilities), the European corporate debt market could generate additional revenues of $
2.2 billion a year in origination fees and trading income. This revenue would accrue to
institutions such as US investment banks that have strong corporate bond origination and
structuring and pricing capabilities, and to institutions that have good relationships with
corporate issuers.
It has been argued that European corporate bond market will never shrive because issues
need to be large - perhaps as big as $ 100 million - to attract adequate attention from
investors, and few European companies can raise this kind of finance. But an analysis of
the US corporate bond market shows that 69 percent of all issues (31 percent of total
market value) are smaller than $ 100 million. Indeed, 46 percent of issues are under $ 50
million. It would therefore seem that there is little to hinder the development of a healthy
corporate bond market in Europe.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 10
As the market evolves, so will the market for higher-yielding corporate paper. A single
currency and strict monetary discipline will mean Europe's government bond market will
offer few opportunities to investors seeking high risks and high returns. This is likely to
prompt demand for debt issued by companies with greater credit risk - a high-margin and
therefore attractive market segment for banks that have strong credit analysis,
structuring, and monitoring skills. The US high-yield corporate bond market is already
shriving, giving US investment banks the chance to acquire experience in this area.
B2. Equities
Equity markets in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands are
relatively mature (exhibit 5), with market capitalization to GDP ratios in line with those
of the United States. Elsewhere in Europe, they are less well developped. There are two
reasons. First, supply has been limited by high corporate tax rates in some countries
(encouraging companies to remain private in order to shelter income in off-shore
accounts), and by the availability of cheap bank loans. Second, investor demand for
equities has been constrained by a lack of large institutional pension funds, and by the
availability of high-yielding government bonds.
Nevertheless, a single European equity market is poised for tremendous growth. The
overwhelming burden that state-funded pension schemes plays on government budgets,
combined with EMU's constraints on government borrowing will accelerate pension
reform and the birth of private pension schemes. These schemes will flood equity














































Market capitalization / GDP
percent
Exhibit 5 - Size of European stock markets, 1996© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 11
EMU will also increase the supply of equities. Again, by a constraining government debt
issuance, EMU will encourage the privatization of state-owned industry (privatizations
worth $ 125 billion are expected to come to market 1998-2003). In addition, medium-
sized European corporations are expected to start making public offerings. Growth may
prove critical to the survival of many of them when a single currency finally eliminates
entry barriers, and equity could be a ready source of capital. There are about 20,000
private European companies with a turnover over $ 50 to $ 250 million, all potential IPO
candidates.
Which banks benefit from this growth in supply will depend on the size of the issue. In
the case of larger privatizations, the winners are likely to be integrated, top-tier
investment banks that can originate and distribute issues globally. In the middle-market
segment, there may be opportunities for reasonably sophisticated regional and local
banks that can leverage strong corporate relationships. One of the EMU's most
immediate effects will be the shift, the asset allocation of many investors from a national
domestic focus to a pan-european sector focus. A German institutional investor, say,
might currently hold as much as 90 percent of its equities portfolio in German stocks. To
reflect the German market's capitalization in a pan-european market, that share would
have to be reduced to 25 percent. This rebalancing will generate enormous business for
brokers. Those best placed to capture it will be the large, pan-european brokers with
sector-focussed research departments able to meet the needs of investors who, with the
removal of national financing boundaries, increasingly want to assess and compare
European equities on a sector basis.
However, growth in business volumes will be offset by sustained pressure on origination
fees and selling commissions (exhibit 6). This may deter institutions that have not already
got strong equity capabilities and a top-notch research function from competing in the
market, given the high cost of building the necessary skills (exhibit 7).© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 12
                 Origination                Trading
Exhibit 6 -Revenue potential in European equity
Excluding proprietary trading; $ billion,  estimated
1996
Growth in issuance
Growth in equities turnover
Fall in equity commissions **
*   international fees (currently 3.5%) are likely to come down to the level of domestic fees (2%)
** approx. -20%
9.0









Typical cost structure of a first-tier player
Percent













* 75% of all research costs; 25% are allocated to corporate finance
Source: Nelson‘s Directory of Investment Managers; McKinsey analysis
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B4. Consulting and M & A services
EMU is likely to create a notable increase in demand for consulting and M & A services.
Although a single European market in terms of free trade has existed since 1992, the
expected cross-border consolidation will, however, be an important catalyst. With
investors using the best corporate performers on the continent as their benchmark, many
of Europe's industries will have to restructure to close productivity gaps. Companies
with limited domestic growth opportunities will also be more eager to venture into other
European markets when currency risk is eliminated, especially in industries where there
are economies of scale to exploit.
The banks best positioned to take advantage of this increase in demand for M & A and
consulting services will be multiproduct institutions with strong strategic relationships, M
& A expertise, sector expertise, and, above all, cross-border networks. Revenues could
reach more than $ 3 billion by 2006.
C. Post-EMU banking strategies
European banks can be segmented according to the scope of their wholesale businesses
and their geographic reach. They fall into three categories:
1. global aspirants,
2. national players (those that have ventured outside their domestic market on the basis
of a specific expertise, such as Spanish banks using their cultural connections to
expand in Latin America), and
3. local and regional players.
Their starting positions largely determine the strategic possibilities open to them within a
monetary union.
1. Global aspirants
The global aspirants are the top-tier of European wholesale banks. Their wholesale
businesses, covering abroad a ray of markets and geographic regions, account for up to
80 percent of revenues. They have invested heavily to build abilities in many key
investment banking markets and to forge relationships with corporate issuers of
securities and institutional investors.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 14
Yet half of the six or so European banks that aspire to leading positions in the European
market are likely to be disappointed. As already stated, big banks will have the greatest
advantages within EMU. But size alone will not suffice. The ultimate winners must be
able to assume leadership in several different wholesale markets and meet the range of
needs of corporate issuers and institutional investors in different products, currencies,
and geographies.
In this respect, the leading US investment banks already enjoy advantages over European
banks in the race for leadership in Europe. To begin with, their home market is huge and
highly profitable, giving them substantial ressources for expansion. In addition, their
access to investors in North American market appeals to large European corporate
issuers. Even now, through alliances and mergers, they are investing to a correct and
apparent weakness: their lack of retail distribution capabilities. Most important, their
integrated culture, sustained through organic growth, has enabled them to provide
effective service to clients accross currencies, regions, and product markets.
By contrast, European aspirants are plagued with problems. Although they may be
strong in traditional wholesale banking, their expertise in key investment banking
products such as equity, origination and advisory services is patchy. The lack of credible
US securities business is also seen by many as a fundamental weakness, given that US
investors represent about 60 percent of the global investor pool for securities. European
aspirants therefore need to make massive investments in their equity and advisory
businesses, and then be prepared for returns to materialize only slowly, since profitability
is likely to be low or non-existent until a bank reaches a position of leadership. Finally,
because European aspirants have built their investment businesses by hiring from other
banks and making mergers, they face challenges in integrating disparate cultures.
So what are the options for these banks, assuming that there will be only seven or eight
leading investment banks operating in Europe, and that four or five US institutions
already command an almost unassailable lead? The main strategic question they must ask
is whether they should invest in building a position in US securities, a vital component of
leadership in investment banking. This could be achieved by merging a whole bank, by
entering some form of joint venture with a US bank, or by acquiring a series of
components. All of these options would be expensive, but precedents indicate that an© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 15
organic built-up in the United States is unlikely to work. Bank shareholders will
therefore have to decide whether they wish to gamble still more on efforts to build an
integrated investment bank.
It may be, however, that leadership of some of the traditional wholesale businesses is
more profitable and more nearly within the reach of Europe's global aspirants than
leadership in the hotly contested investment banking businesses. In the interests of
shareholders, banks should thus ask themselves whether it would be wiser to build on
existing strength and competitive advantages - such as a strong balance sheet, good
corporate relationships, treasury market capabilities (in foreign exchange and money
markets), or experience in fixed income, payments, and lending - in order to become a
leader in one or more of these fields.
2. National players
Like global aspirants, national players are wholesale driven rather than retail-focussed,
deriving approximately 60 to 70 percent of their revenues from wholesale activities.
However, their international operations are limited and their equity and advisory
businesses even weaker than those of global aspirants. After EMU, these banks will no
longer be able to rely on the profits from trading their own investment portfolios to drive
their businesses. Competition in all their traditional markets will intensify, volumes and
margins will fall, and they will suffer from a competitive disadvantage because of their













































































































































































































































































Exhibit 8 - German banks‘ evolution path and earnings under pressure
Regional banks
One option for a bank in this position would be to sell all or part of its wholesale
investment business to a player willing to pay for its capabilities and market position.
However, the pace of consolidation in the industry and the overlap among players means
it might not be easy to find buyers for such a business, nor indeed jobs for its employees.
Two further options would be to try to build a purely pan-European position, or to adopt
a niche position. The former would be difficult in view of the investment needed, the
insensity of competition from US banks and global aspirants, and the questionable
viability of such a strategy. The latter option is more feasible. But banks adopting it
would have to identify their niches as early as possible to fill the gap left by the decline of
their traditional wholesale businesses.
National banks need to examine their current customer franchise to identify areas in
which they have advantages. Some may be well positioned to serve the middle-market
corporations that top-tier investment banks cannot serve economically. Others might be
useful to an industry's sector with specialized needs. German banks, for example, could
be well placed to the machinery or chemical sector specialists, since the industry is
dominated by German-based corporations.
Product markets should be examined in the same light. Could a bank, for example, build
a specialist position in the high-yielding segment of the corporate bond market? And© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 17
what about geographic focus? Could a bank perhaps exploit corporate and institutional
client business spanning European and emerging markets? Some German and Austrian
banks already have strong commercial banking operations in Eastern Europe on which
they might be able to build investment banking business.
3. Local and regional players
Local and regional players, especially Geno-Banks and Sparkassen in Germany, are retail
banks first and formost. Traditional wholesale banking generates only 30 to 40 percent of
their revenues and their investment banking capabilities are relatively insignificant. These
banks should consider withdrawing altogether from wholesale banking into retail
banking. The drawback of this strategy is that in an area of pension reform, even retail
clients will want mutual fund products and equity brokerage services from their banks.
Local players might, therefore, have to form strategic alliances or mergers in order to
provide a universal banking frange of products and services in space.
The only other option for these institutions is to focus on a specific niche (such as
middle-market corporate lending and deposits). The choice will be economically limited,
as in most cases these banks' advantages will amount only to a few technical skills, a
strong but deteriorating corporate franchise, and some local market knowhow.
Moreover, the niches in which they possess advantages may not be very large, which
would mean scaling down considerably.
Especially the promise of lower transaction costs, increased sales productivity, and more
convenient services has lured traditional banks into a setting-up of new electronic and
product-specific channels. But they have quickly found that their delivery capabilities are

















Exhibit 9a - Estimated channel usage by bank customers
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Exhibit 9c - Structure of direct-banking-services-demand
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As a result, they face stubbornly high efficiency ratios, expected revenues that never
materialize, and general managers at odds with the standards by which they are measured
and rewarded. To resolve these problems, regional and local banks must adopt a new
approach to the management of multiple channels. In particular, they must address four
issues:
1. Who owns the customer?
2. How are operational issues resolved?
3. How are managers measured and rewarded?
4. Where does each business fit?
1. Customer ownership
The notion that customers can be "owned" is championed by branch managers seeking to
preserve a branch-centered organisation. They maintain that the branch remains the
prime point of contact for sales, service, and relationship management. But their
argument does not stand up to close scrutiny. Far from staying local to a branch, most
customers today use a number of channels.
They graze from ATM to telephone to branch, depending on their needs at any given
time. They are no more "owned" by a banking channel that they are by a TV channel. If a
bank designing a multichannel organisation persists in assuming that a channel can own
customers, it is deluding itself about how customers use banks and the range of choices
they enjoy.
2. Operational issues
This familiar refrain is sounded by advocates of "customer-centered" management. For
them, locl and regional retail banks should be organised around customer segments, and
those who manage these segments should dictate what products and services are
available and how they are delivered. But this approach can be dangerous. Most delivery
channels are used by several customer segments, and a channel decision made by a
manager of one of them could at worsely affect other segments. Say the owner of a
mass-market segment directed branch tellers to encourage these customers to use ATMs.
If the tellers inadvertently encouraged mass-affluent customers to do the same, they
might prompt unwanted defections among these customers.© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 21
Resolving operational issues such as how products in channels will be offered to target
customers must be an explicit part of multichannel management design. It is also likely to
require CEO involvement, for two reasons:
First, decisions on these issues help to shape a bank's customer value proposition. Will
customers enjoy universal access to the full portfolio of channels, for example, or will
there be incentives (or disincentives) to use certain channels?
Second, a decision that is optimal for a business units perspective may not be optimal for
the institution as a whole. The CEO must be involved in decisions such as:
Can dedicated product delivery platforms, such as investment centers, develop their own
brands independently of the banks umbrella brand? Can individual channels chose to
distribute other providers' products, such as mutual funds an mortages, if they see a
profit opportunity? Will the various sales forces be allowed to compete directly, or be
required to collaborate?
3. Performance measurement and rewards
In a regional or local multichannel organisation, developping performance measures
means:
1. Allocating accountability for profit and loss to the right people
2. Closely tracking the key economic drivers of the business, whether by channel,
product or customer
3. Obtaining meaningful space, channel, product, cost, and revenue data from
management information systems so that appropriate standards can be established.
One unfortunate legacy of the branch-centered system in space is that a customer's
balances and revenues are normally allocated to branches, regardless of the channels
actually used by the customer. As a result, the contribution of branches to the network is
often overestimated, and that of newer channels underestimated. This means that the new
channels have to depend on acquiring new customers for revenue, even when most of
their customers are branch-based.
Allocating revenue to regional or local branches has two consequences: First, only the
CEO bares all the responsibility for managing performance. Other senior managers are© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 22
unable to find out how profitable their businesses really are. Second, banks lack the tools
and measures to make informed decisions about resource allocation.
4. Structure and reporting
As banks add new channels to their delivery networks in space, it becomes harder for the
branch-centered organisation to manage products, segments, and channels, and the
connections between them. Decision-making slows down, issues get "kicked upstairs",
and managers' view of how their businesses are performing is blinkered by unresponsive
IT systems that have failed to keep pace with the evolving of the network.
Within the bank, leaders become more internally focussed. Instead of running their
businesses, they get caught up in the issues and conflicts that arise because the decision-
making framework does not match the complexity of their business. In one bank, all
marketing decisions concerning products and delivery were still funnelled through a
single strategic marketing group, despite the fact that the number of choices offered to
costumers had increased five-fold in recent years. The group became a bottleneck and
the focus of internal conflict as it tried to prioritize and reconcile the bank's marketing
messages.
D. Possible models for regional and local banks to challenge the future
Any bank seeking to improve its channel management must explicitely address four key
issues. For its organisational design, it can chose from three broad models on a scale that
ranges from tight coordination to unfettered competition (exhibit 10).© Dr. Bernd Nolte Universität Hohenheim / UDF Consulting AG  page 23
Increasing reliance on...
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The choice of model will ultimately depend on the bank' s strategy (does it emphasize
space units, customers or products?), its market position (low market share would argue
for more aggressive competition between channels because the bank's objective is
acquiring customers rather than increasing its share of wallet of existing customers), and
its view of how the market is likely to evolve (for instance, the speed of product































Exhibit 11 - Choosing the right model
View of industry evolution
Starting position
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All banks face though decisions. Those most likely to be successful within EMU are
those that recognize the speed and magnitude of the changes they face and launch bold
programs to address both the threats and the opportunities. Especially regional and local
banks in a sandwich position between a cost-driven competition of direct-banks and a
know-how-value-driven competition of specialized global players will move in merger-
era. This evolution will be accompanied by a deep reorganization of their distibution
channnels, their internal structures and the sales territories in space. Changing
investments in qualitative, personnrl and technological requirements, considering the
benchmarks in competition will lead to a fundamental restructuring of Sparkassen and
Geno-Banks in Europe.
For some, this will mean aggressive retrenchment, disposal of businesses, and a renewed
focus on retail banking. For others, it will entail substantial investment in the
development and implementation of national and/or global strategies to become market
leaders. Banks that follow neither course will succeed only in destroying value for
stakeholders and their surrounding economic network in space.
Sources: Bundesverband deutscher Banken
Gesellschaft für Bankpublizität
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte
OECD Financial Market Trends, 1998/99
BIZ
FORIT
UDF Consulting AG